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I. INTRODUCTION
When federal agencies fail to issue regulations, respond to petitions, approve plans, review standards, or take any number of actions that
are required by statute, the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
and federal environmental laws authorize citizens to sue the agencies to
force them to carry out their legal obligations.1 Indeed, Congress anticipated that citizens would play an important role in the enforcement of
federal environmental laws.2 When faced with lawsuits for failing to perform non-discretionary duties, agencies tend to settle because their liability is clear.3
As part of such settlements, the agencies will generally agree to
comply with their legal obligations according to a new schedule negotiated with the challengers.4 Consequently, the agencies ultimately carry
out their statutorily mandated obligations, albeit later than Congress demanded. Needless to say, there are those who would prefer that the agencies continue to ignore their statutory obligations and abstain from issuing new regulations, approving air quality control plans, listing species as
*
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1. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012) (citizen suit provision);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) (citizen suit provision); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012) (citizen suit provision); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(2006) (citizen suit provision); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) (provision authorizing judicial review of final agency actions).
2. See infra Part IV.A.
3. See infra Part IV.B.1.
4. See WILLIAM L. KOVACS, KEITH W. HOLMAN & JONATHAN A. JACKSON, U. S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE: REGULATING BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 30–42 (2013) [hereinafter
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT], available at https://www.uschamber.com/sites
/default/files/legacy/reports/SUEANDSETTLEREPORT-Final.pdf.
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endangered, or taking other actions required by law. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these settlements have long been controversial. Public, private, and
governmental interests continue to contest the proper balance and mechanisms by which federal agencies function and fulfill their obligations.
Criticisms of “Sue and Settle”
In the spring of 2013, industry groups and states began a concerted
lobbying effort to oppose citizen enforcement of the federal environmental laws. The United States Chamber of Commerce and lobbyists for
states created a catch-phrase—“sue and settle”—to demonize citizen enforcement and the federal government’s practice of settling lawsuits it is
destined to lose in court.5 The Chamber alleged that the federal government, by settling lawsuits brought by citizens groups rather than defending them in court, was colluding with those non-governmental organizations and excluding other affected parties to reallocate the agencies’ priorities and obligations.6
According to the Chamber, sue and settle occurs when an agency
intentionally relinquishes its statutory discretion by accepting lawsuits
from outside groups that effectively dictate the priorities and duties of
the agency through legally binding, court-approved settlements negotiated behind closed doors—with no participation by other affected parties
or the public.”7 The Chamber criticized such settlements on the grounds
that affected parties are not involved in the settlement negotiations, do
not have adequate notice that settlement negotiations are ongoing, and do
not have adequate opportunities to review and comment on the settlement agreements.8
In a May 2013 report, the Chamber reviewed lawsuits that were settled by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of
Interior, and other agencies between 2009 and 2012. The report concluded that seventy-one of those lawsuits were sue and settle cases.9 With
regard to the EPA, the Chamber alleged that the agency “chose . . . not to
defend itself . . . at least 60 times between 2009 and 2012 [and] [i]n each
case, it agreed to settlements on terms favorable to [special interest advo-

5. Id. at 3.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 5–6.
9. Id. at 12. The report asserted that “other agencies, including the U.S. Forest Service, the
Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Department of Commerce, have also agreed to this tactic.”
Id. at 5.
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cacy] groups.”10 The Chamber alleged that those settlements “directly
resulted in EPA agreeing to publish more than 100 new regulations,
many of which impose compliance costs in the tens of millions and even
billions of dollars.”11
The report asserted that federal agencies are settling sue and settle
lawsuits far more frequently during the current Presidential administration than during prior administrations.12 The Chamber also criticized the
congressional decision allowing courts to award attorney’s fees in these
kinds of lawsuits. The authors of the Chamber report noted that attorney’s fees were awarded in forty-nine of the seventy-one sue and settle
cases, concluding that “advocacy groups are incentivized by federal
funding to bring sue and settle lawsuits and exert direct influence over
agency agendas.”13
At about the same time as the Chamber released its report, the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), an organization of
state legislators,14 released a report criticizing sue and settle lawsuits on
the grounds that the settlements frequently do not involve the participation of states that will be affected by the settlements.15 The authors of the
report noted that the federal environmental statutes are generally enforced through a model of cooperative federalism, where the States have
important rights and obligations.16 The authors complained, however,
that “[w]ith sue and settle, the EPA has found a way to cut states out of
the process, instead negotiating the agency’s priorities with environmental special interests.”17 Like the Chamber report, the ALEC report
charged that the sue and settle practice has increased dramatically over
the past few years.18

10. Id. at 5.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 13–14. The report cites sixty such settlements during the Obama Administration’s
first term (2009–2012), compared with twenty-eight (second Bush term), thirty-eight (first Bush
term), and twenty-seven (second Clinton term) in previous administrations.
13. Id. at 12 n.14.
14. The Council is “the nation’s largest nonpartisan, individual membership organization of
state legislators . . . [and is] committed to advancing the Jeffersonian principles of free markets,
limited government, federalism[,] and individual liberty.” WILLIAM YEATMAN, AM. LEGISLATIVE
EXCH. COUNCIL, THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S ASSAULT ON STATE
SOVEREIGNTY iii (2013) [hereinafter ALEC, STATE SOVEREIGNTY REPORT], available at
http://alec.org/docs/EPA_Assault_State_Sovereignty.
15. See id at 5–7.
16. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 6. The report identifies forty-eight sue and settle agreements during President
Obama’s first term, compared to eight agreements during President Bush’s second term. Id.

894

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:891

State regulators have also criticized the EPA’s litigation strategies
on several recent occasions. In the spring of 2013, regulators from twenty-one states sent a letter to the EPA, urging the agency to refrain from
agreeing to establish power plant carbon dioxide emission limits for
power plants in settling a suit brought by environmental groups.19 In addition, the Attorneys General of twelve states submitted a Freedom of
Information Act request to the EPA to provide the states with “records
concerning EPA’s practice of entering into consent decrees with nongovernmental organizations in cases concerning the implementation of
several environmental programs”20—the agreements that critics label sue
and settle agreements.21 When the EPA denied that request, the Attorneys General requested all records concerning negotiations between the
EPA and non-governmental organizations that led to a consent decree
regarding implementation of the Clean Air Act’s (CAA) regional haze
program.22 When the EPA denied the request on the grounds that it was
overbroad, the states filed a lawsuit challenging the agency’s denial,23
asserting that the “EPA’s actions were not consistent with the cooperative federalism structure of the CAA or the Regional Haze program.”24
Congress has also taken an interest in this issue. In 2012, Representative Ben Quayle introduced the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees
and Settlements Act to impose limits on settlement agreements and consent decrees involving federal agencies.25 After the bill died in the 112th
Congress, it was reintroduced in the 113th Congress as House Resolution
1493 and Senate Bill 714.26 The proposed legislation would broaden intervention in lawsuits involving federal agencies, establish cumbersome
19. See Michael Bastasch, 21 States Tell EPA to Avoid ‘Sue and Settle’ Lawsuits, DAILY
CALLER (June 19, 2013), http://dailycaller.com/2013/06/19/21-states-tell-epa-to-avoid-sue-and-settle
-lawsuits/.
20. See Complaint ¶ 19, Pruitt v. EPA, No. 5:13-cv-0726 (W.D. Okla. July 16, 2013).
21. See Andrea Vittorio, Attorneys General Seek EPA Compliance with FOIA over ‘Sue and
Settle’ Tactics, 44 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2150 (July 7, 2013).
22. See Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 18.
23. See generally id.
24. Id. ¶ 18. Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, the EPA’s Inspector General (IG) announced
that the IG would investigate how the agency decides what information to release under FOIA. See
Andrea Vittorio, Inspector General Plans to Investigate EPA on Freedom of Information Act Requests, 44 ENV’T REP. (BNA) (July 26, 2013). Representatives of the EPA declined to indicate
whether the investigation was related to the lawsuit or whether it was related to a recent report from
the Competitive Enterprise Institute that concluded that the agency treats fee waiver requests under
FOIA by environmental groups more favorably than requests by conservative groups. Vittorio, supra.
25. Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2012, H.R. 3862, 112th Cong.
(2012).
26. Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2013, H.R. 1493, 113th Cong.
(2013); S. 714, 113th Cong. (2013).
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settlement procedures, create a more formal notice-and-comment process
for settlements, require agencies to provide more explanation of (and
justification for) settlements, and change the rules for judicial supervision and review of settlements.27
Criticism of federal agencies’ seemingly collusive settlement of
lawsuits is not a new phenomenon. Toward the end of the last century,
academics and grassroots environmental groups criticized “rulemaking
settlement” by agencies.28 At that time, critics were concerned that industry groups frequently sued agencies after the agencies promulgated regulations, and then the parties entered into settlement agreements—without
public participation or the participation of public interest groups—that
led to amendment of the rules in a manner favorable to the industry
groups.29 Critics were concerned that agencies and industry groups were
negotiating substantive changes to rules without adequate public participation.
In contrast to those earlier challenges, the current sue and settle critics focus primarily on settlements by agencies with environmental
groups that change the timing of agency decision making, rather than the
substance of the decision making.30 Although the sue and settle lawsuits
cited by critics rarely involved the negotiation of substantive changes to
final rules, the reforms suggested by the Chamber and Congress are
much more severe than the reforms suggested decades ago to address
“rulemaking settlements” between agencies and industries that addressed
such substantive changes.31 The “cure” proposed for sue and settle lawsuits is much worse than the “disease” (if there is a disease at all).
Federal environmental laws establish a central role for citizens in
enforcement of the laws, and citizens will continue to sue the EPA and
other federal agencies when the agencies fail to meet statutory deadlines
or carry out their duties under the laws, regardless of whether Congress
adopts the proposed reforms. The reforms will simply make settlement of
those lawsuits much more difficult, resulting in a longer litigation process that imposes higher costs on the government. In addition, since the
cases are, for the most part, clear losers for the agencies, longer litigation
will lead to higher awards of attorney’s fees. More significantly, the
longer litigation will delay the inevitable agency action and all of its en27. Id.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See sources cited infra notes 42–60 and accompanying text.
30. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30–40.
31. Compare sources cited infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text (outlining reform proposals by Professors Jeffrey Gaba and Jim Rossi), with sources cited infra notes 96–118 and accompanying text (outlining reform proposals from the Chamber of Commerce and Congress).
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vironmental and other benefits for many years. To the extent that reforms
are necessary, much more modest proposals would suffice. This Article
considers the features and history of rulemaking settlement controversies
and proposes modest, sensible proposals for systemic improvement.
Part II of this Article examines “rulemaking settlements,” including
the criticisms of those settlements and reforms suggested by the earlier
critics. Despite the differences in foci and constituents between current
and past settlement controversies, examining the past issues helps to
frame and inform any address of current issues. Part III of this Article
identifies the concerns raised by the modern critics of sue and settle lawsuits and describes the solutions proposed by those critics and Congress.
Part IV outlines the important role that citizen enforcement plays in environmental laws, responds to the concerns raised by critics of sue and settle lawsuits, critiques the solutions proposed by the Chamber of Commerce and Congress, and suggests more modest reforms.
II. RULEMAKING SETTLEMENTS
Toward the end of the last century, Professor Jeffrey Gaba noted
that the promulgation of “final” rules by federal agencies through noticeand-comment rulemaking is often “merely the first round in a larger process in which truly final regulations may be promulgated only after the
government and affected parties have privately negotiated their contents.”32 Several years later, Professor Jim Rossi described the continuing
trend of agencies to develop rules through negotiations to settle lawsuits,
recognizing the potential advantages and disadvantages of the trend.33 On
the positive side, Rossi noted that “rulemaking settlements” were consistent with the trend, in administrative law, in favor of “private ordering
over state imposed solutions” and the trend “toward flexible, consensual
mechanisms for regulation, emphasizing less rigid, cooperative approaches over prolonged adversarial disputes.”34
“Rulemaking settlements” can be structured as settlement agreements between the litigating parties that result in the stay or ultimate
dismissal of a lawsuit (or both) or as consent decrees negotiated by the
parties that are then judicially enforceable.35 While Professors Rossi and
32. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L.J. 1241,
1241–42 (1985).
33. See Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest
in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015 (2001).
34. Id. at 1016. Rossi pointed out the similarities between “rulemaking settlements” and negotiated rulemaking. Id.
35. Id. at 1023; Gaba, supra note 32, at 1246–47.
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Gaba focus most of their analysis of “rulemaking settlements” on settlements of lawsuits filed to challenge final agency regulations, there are
several contexts in which the settlements could arise. As Professor Gaba
notes, the agreements “have fallen into one of three categories: scheduling agreements, process agreements, and substantive agreements.”36
Professor Gaba describes a “scheduling agreement” as one that
“specifies the date by which the [agency] will promulgate a regulation
[and is] usually negotiated in the course of litigation challenging the
agency’s failure to issue regulations specifically required by statute.”37
As Gaba notes, such agreements “dictate neither the content of the final
regulations nor the steps the agency will take to develop the regulations.”38 Scheduling agreements are also used to set deadlines to settle
lawsuits brought when agencies fail to carry out other non-discretionary
duties. Statutory-deadline suits are a major source of litigation for the
Environmental Protection Agency, as the environmental statutes include
hundreds of statutory deadlines.39
In contrast to a scheduling agreement, a “process agreement” does
not specify the content or date of an agency regulation or action, “but the
process the agency will employ to develop the regulation.”40 The last
type of agreement, the “substantive agreement,” involves agreement on
the actual substance of an agency regulation or agency action.41 In most
cases, the substantive agreement simply results in a proposed rule that
the agency will adopt through normal notice-and-comment procedures,
which include opportunities for public involvement in the development
of the rule.42
While the current controversies center on settlement agreements
and consent decrees between federal agencies and public interest organizations, rulemaking settlements have been frequently used by regulated
entities as well. As the United States Chamber of Commerce acknowl36. Gaba, supra note 32, at 1243.
37. Id. at 1243.
38. Id. at 1244.
39. See William Yeatman, EPA’s Woeful Deadline Performance Raises Questions About
Agency Competence, Climate Change Regulations, “Sue and Settle,” COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE
INST. (July 10, 2013), http://cei.org/sites/default/files/William%20Yeatman%20-%20EPA%27s%2
0Woeful%20Deadline%20Performance%20Raises%20Questions%20About%20Agency%20Compet
ence.pdf. In a study of rules issued between 1988 and 2003, Jacob Gersen and Anne O’Connell
noted that the EPA was required to comply with more than 1,000 statutory deadlines during that time
period. See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 15 U. PA.
L. REV. 923, 940 (2008).
40. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1244.
41. Id. at 1245.
42. Id. at 1246.
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edged in its report on sue and settle lawsuits, the “tactic” has been used
for many years by business groups as well as public interest organizations and by both Republican and Democratic administrations.43 As Professor Rossi points out, rulemaking settlements may frequently arise during changes in presidential administrations because “an outgoing administration may use settlement to commit a new administration to a policy
course, or an incoming administration may use settlement to undermine
regulatory actions adopted by the outgoing administration.”44
Most of the rulemaking settlements between regulated entities and
states involve substantive agreements rather than scheduling agreements.45 One of the most heavily criticized examples of this tactic by
regulated entities or states involved the settlement, during the Bush Administration, of litigation brought to challenge a rule adopted during the
Clinton Administration that limited logging, mining, and road building
on millions of acres of land in national forests (the “roadless rule”).46
When states and industry groups sued the Forest Service, the Bush Administration entered into agreements with the challengers to exempt millions of acres of land in Alaska from coverage under the rule and to establish a process to exempt vast amounts of acreage in other states from
coverage under the rule.47 The Bush Administration argued that the collaborative process established in the settlements was preferable over continuing to defend the litigation.48
In another case during the Bush Administration, the government
settled a lawsuit brought by the state of Utah challenging the Department
of Interior’s authority to adopt a policy that directed agency staff to create inventories of lands that could be identified and protected as wilderness.49 In settling the case, the government stipulated that it had no authority to designate over 220 million acres of land throughout the country
as wilderness, even though the case only involved a challenge to the designation of 2.6 million acres of land in Utah.50
In addition to those cases, critics have condemned other “sweetheart deal” settlements with states and industry during the Bush Admin43. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–14.
44. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1033.
45. See Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush II, 11
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 394 (2004).
46. Id. at 394–96; see also Martin Nie, Administrative Rulemaking and Public Lands Conflict:
The Forest Service’s Roadless Rule, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 687, 709–10 (2004).
47. See Parenteau, supra note 45, at 394–96; Nie, supra note 46, at 709–10.
48. See Nie, supra note 46, at 711.
49. See Parenteau, supra note 45, at 396–98.
50. Id. at 397–98.
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istration, including an agreement to eliminate a ban on the use of snowmobiles in Yellowstone National Park, an agreement to review the endangered listing of the northern spotted owl (despite scientific evidence
demonstrating that the population was declining), and an agreement to
allow more logging on spotted owl reserves.51 All of those agreements
were substantive agreements, rather than scheduling agreements. When
an agency enters into a substantive agreement, it is generally exercising a
greater level of discretion than when it enters into a scheduling agreement, and there is a greater need for some limit on the settlement process.
Recent studies by Professor Wendy Wagner and Professor Cary
Coglianese suggest that, even today, regulated entities may be able to use
the sue and settle tactic more effectively than environmental groups to
influence agencies to make substantive changes to final rules, as opposed
to using the tactic to establish new deadlines in scheduling agreements.52
Professor Wagner examined the rulemaking life cycle of ninety toxic-air
emission standards adopted by the EPA to compare the influence of environmental groups and industry in the pre-rulemaking, rulemaking, and
post-rulemaking process.53 Similarly, Professor Coglianese examined a
set of hazardous-waste rules adopted by the EPA to compare the influence of various groups in those rulemaking proceedings.54 Both Wagner
and Coglianese determined that the post-rulemaking period presents significant opportunities for parties to influence agencies to change their
rules, through litigation or otherwise.55 In Wagner’s study, industry
groups or environmental groups brought judicial challenges or filed petitions for reconsideration for 22% of the toxic-air emission rules.56 Industry groups brought more challenges than environmental groups for those
rules.57 In Professor Coglianese’s study, 44% of the hazardous-waste
rules that he examined were either challenged in court or subjected to a
petition for reconsideration.58 While half of those cases settled, most of
the settlements only involved regulated industry.59 In the article describing her study, Professor Wagner noted that regulated parties are likely to
51. Id. at 400–01.
52. See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emissions Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99 (2011).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 108, 114, 136.
55. Id. at 113–15.
56. Id. at 134.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 136.
59. Id.
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have an advantage in motivating the agencies to make changes to rules
through litigation because regulated parties are more likely to bring challenges that lead to rule delays, compared to environmental groups who
often bring challenges that seek to vacate rules entirely.60
Critics have expressed concerns about agencies entering into settlement agreements with environmental groups, regulated entities, or
states when such agreements substantively change finalized rules, policies, or actions. For instance, Professor Rossi and Professor Gaba have
both recognized that rulemaking settlements limit the participation of
non-parties that are likely to be affected by the terms of the settlement.61
Professor Rossi argues that when agencies’ regulations or decisions are
challenged in court, the agencies have an incentive to settle the lawsuit
quickly in order to implement their decision without delay and avoid
high litigation costs.62
Rossi notes that many persons who are affected by the agencies’
regulations or decisions and who may have been involved in the initial
development of the rulemaking or decision will not be involved in the
negotiations to settle the lawsuit. He notes further that agencies may have
an incentive to limit affected persons’ involvement in the negotiation
process if it would slow down the settlement of the lawsuit.63 Thus, Rossi
recognizes that rulemaking settlements can limit the participation of persons who are likely to be affected by the substantive terms of the settlement.64 Further, he suggests that agencies may be willing to make concessions in the negotiations that are not in the public interest and that the
agencies might not have been willing to make if a wider array of interested persons were involved in the settlement negotiations.65
Professor Rossi also raises concerns that the settlement negotiation
process is not transparent and that the parties to the litigation are negotiating substantive changes to agency rules or decisions “in secret.”66 Rossi
expresses heightened concerns when the settlement to which the agency
and litigants agree can be implemented without additional processes for
public participation, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.67
Although the policies that agencies and litigants agree to when they
enter into substantive rulemaking settlements must generally be imple60. Id. at 115.
61. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1016–20; Gaba, supra note 32, at 1267–68.
62. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1026.
63. Id. at 1027.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1016–17.
66. Id. at 1029.
67. Id.
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mented through subsequent notice-and-comment proceedings, Professor
Gaba recognizes that agencies have some incentive to finalize rules in
the subsequent notice-and-comment process in a manner consistent with
the rules that were proposed as part of the settlement agreement. Thus,
critics might argue that the subsequent rulemaking procedure is not procedurally adequate, since the agency may be biased in the rulemaking
process.68
To address some of the concerns outlined above, Professor Rossi
suggests that it is important to provide broad notice of potential rulemaking settlements.69 He argues that courts should “referee whether parties
have been given adequate notice of a settlement,” and since he is focusing primarily on settlement of lawsuits challenging rules that have been
adopted by agencies, he argues that courts should attempt to ensure that
persons who commented on the rule during the notice-and-comment period are provided notice of the settlement.70 Similarly, Professor Gaba
stresses the importance of providing notice of proposed settlements to
non-parties who could be affected by the settlements and who are interested in the proceedings.71
Both Professor Gaba and Professor Rossi suggest that the rules regarding intervention in lawsuits should be read liberally to allow nonparties to participate in the lawsuit that gives rise to the rulemaking settlement when the interests of the non-parties are not otherwise being adequately represented.72 Finally, both Professor Rossi and Professor Gaba
suggest that courts should play a more active role in reviewing the rulemaking settlements. Professor Rossi suggests that courts should engage
in “hard look” arbitrary-and-capricious review of rulemaking settlements
to force agencies to provide a more complete explanation of the factors
raised in the settlement negotiations that ultimately motivated the agencies to enter into the agreement.73 He recognizes, though, that there is not
clear legal authority for that level of judicial scrutiny.74 Similarly, Professor Gaba suggests that courts could require that agencies provide a
written justification for the changes to rules that are proposed as part of a
rulemaking settlement or that the settlement be published with an opportunity for non-parties to comment on the settlement.75
68. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1242, 1251–58.
69. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1047–49.
70. Id. at 1048–49.
71. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1275–76.
72. See id. at 1276–78; Rossi, supra note 33, at 1047.
73. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1050–57.
74. Id. at 1056–57.
75. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1278–79.
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While Professors Gaba and Rossi raised those concerns to rulemaking settlements involving substantive changes to agencies’ rules or final
actions, both stressed that scheduling agreements raise far fewer concerns.76 Nonetheless, scheduling agreements are subject to criticism, as
explored in the next Part.
III. THE “SUE AND SETTLE” CRITICISMS AND REFORMS
While academics have, for several decades, criticized “rulemaking
settlements” in lawsuits involving substantive changes to agencies’ rules
or final actions, the recent wave of criticism of sue and settle lawsuits
with the federal government focuses on lawsuits that are brought when a
federal agency has not issued a regulation by a statutory deadline or has
failed to take some other “non-discretionary” action that the law requires
the agency to take, and the agency settles the lawsuit with a “scheduling
agreement.” Indeed, 83% of the lawsuits that were the focus of the report
issued by the United States Chamber of Commerce involved such challenges.77 Nevertheless, the criticisms raised by business groups and states
are broader, and the reforms suggested are more stringent, than those
raised by academics in the past, in the context of rulemaking agreements
where the parties agree to substantive changes to rules or agency actions.
A. Criticisms Raised by the United States Chamber of Commerce
In its spring 2013 report, the United States Chamber of Commerce
alleged that the federal government was “intentionally” relinquishing
statutory discretion by “accepting lawsuits from outside groups that effectively dictate the priorities and duties” of the government without participation of affected parties or the public.78 The Chamber raised con76. See id. at 1244; Rossi, supra note 33, at 1018.
77. The Chamber of Commerce identified seventy-one lawsuits as sue and settle cases resulting
in new rules and agency actions in its report. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 30–40. In fifty-nine of those lawsuits, the plaintiffs were suing because the
government had failed to take some non-discretionary action. The twelve cases identified in the
Chamber’s report that did not involve failure to take a non-discretionary action included the following: Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, No. 06-0820 (2d Cir. 2010); Natural Res. Def. Council v.
EPA, No. 09-60510 (5th Cir. 2010); New York v. EPA, No. 06-1322 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Sierra Club v.
Jackson, No. 09-1041 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 08-1258 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Portland
Cement Ass’n v. EPA, No. 07-10406 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Salazar, No. 09-00085
(D. Colo. 2011); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 08-03884 (N.D. Cal.
2010); Coal River Mountain Watch v. Salazar, No. 08-02212 (D.D.C. 2010); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. EPA, No. 09-00670 (W.D. Wash. 2010); WildEarth Guardians v. Kempthorne, No. 0800689 (D. Ariz. 2009); and Northwoods Wilderness Recovery v. Kempthorne, No. 08-01407 (N.D.
Ill. 2009).
78. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
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cerns about agency capture; the improper use of congressionally appropriated funds; limited participation for affected parties and the public;
and avoidance of procedural requirements of the APA and other laws or
executive orders regarding rulemaking.
Regarding agency capture, the Chamber alleged that when settling
agencies enter into scheduling agreements that require the agencies to
take actions by specific dates, the agencies are reordering their priorities
and allocation of resources to meet the interests of the challengers and
are limiting their discretion to set those priorities in a manner consistent
with the public interest.79 This allegation could be grounded, in part, on a
policy adopted by Attorney General Edwin Meese in 1986 (the “Meese
memo”) that prohibited the federal government from entering into a consent decree “that divests [a government official] of discretion” or “that
converts into a mandatory duty the otherwise discretionary authority [of
an official] to revise, amend[,] or promulgate regulations.”80 That policy
was subsequently clarified and narrowed during the Clinton Administration, and it has never been interpreted to prohibit the government from
entering into a consent decree to set a timetable for compliance with a
non-discretionary duty after the statutory deadline for compliance has
passed.81
The Chamber also raised separation-of-powers concerns regarding
the reordering of agencies’ priorities and allocation of resources in
scheduling agreements, characterizing the settlement of such lawsuits as
“a situation in which the [E]xecutive [B]ranch expands the authority of
agencies at the expense of congressional oversight . . . with at least the
implicit cooperation of the courts.”82 Similarly, the Chamber asserted
that agencies are improperly using “congressionally appropriated funds
to achieve the demands of private parties” when they enter into agreements that have the effect of reordering the priorities.83
Further, the Chamber alleged that agencies frequently set unrealistic
deadlines in scheduling agreements, causing the agencies to adopt poor
quality rules in response to the short deadlines and to divert resources
79. Id. at 3, 11. The Competitive Enterprise Institute raised similar concerns in an article published in July of 2013, examining EPA’s compliance with statutory deadlines in three Clean Air Act
programs. See Yeatman, supra note 39.
80. See Memorandum from Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen., to All Assistant Att’ys Gen. and All
U.S. Att’ys, Department Policy Regarding Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements 3–4 (Mar.
13, 1986), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-1/Acc060-891-box9-memoAyer-LSWG-1986.pdf.
81. See sources cited infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text.
82. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6–7.
83. Id. at 7.
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from other rulemakings and other actions, which results in poor quality
or delayed decision making in those actions as well.84
In addition to concerns about agencies’ authority to enter into
scheduling agreements, the Chamber raised concerns that the government does not provide adequate opportunities for persons affected by
settlements or the public to participate in the negotiation of the terms of
the settlement because the government does not provide adequate notice
to all interested persons when the government has been sued or when
someone has filed a petition for rulemaking.85 The Chamber alleged that
the failure to provide affected parties and the public with broader opportunities to participate in the negotiation of settlement terms is antidemocratic and will lead to poorly reasoned decisions because the affected parties will not be able to provide important information that would be
relevant to the agency’s decision regarding the settlement terms.86 The
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) asserted similar concerns about exclusion of states from the settlement negotiation process in
its 2013 report.87 Because federal environmental laws frequently provide
for a partnership between the federal government and states in administering and enforcing various provisions of the laws, ALEC alleged that
exclusion of states from the settlement negotiations violated principles of
cooperative federalism that are fundamental to those laws.88
Although there are opportunities for states, affected parties, or the
public generally to receive notice and provide comment for some consent
decrees and settlements, the Chamber, in its report, alleged that those
opportunities are insufficient because agencies rarely change the terms of
consent decrees in response to such input; thus, the opportunity to submit
comments comes too late in the process.89 In the small number of cases
studied where agencies enter into substantive agreements in settlements
or consent decrees, the Chamber also asserted that agencies avoid procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act.90 Although the
agreements generally require agencies to issue proposed rules in accordance with the APA, the Chamber argued that “the outcome of the rule84. Id. at 23–24.
85. Id. at 5–6. The American Legislative Exchange Council raised similar concerns in its report, suggesting that “[s]tates are frequently caught off guard by . . . sue and settle agreements because the EPA doesn’t inform them about the ongoing settlement negotiations.” See ALEC, STATE
SOVEREIGNTY REPORT, supra note 14, at 6.
86. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5, 23.
87. See ALEC, STATE SOVEREIGNTY REPORT, supra note 14, at 1, 5–6.
88. Id. at 1.
89. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 24.
90. Id. at 6.
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making is essentially set,” and the public thus does not have an opportunity to comment as required by the APA.91
Along the same lines, the Chamber alleged that when agencies
agree to expeditious deadlines for action to resolve lawsuits based on
their failure to meet earlier deadlines, they do not provide sufficient time
to comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Unfunded Mandates
Act, and various other statues and executive orders that apply to review
of agencies’ rules.92 The Chamber also alleged that short deadlines limited the review of rules and agency actions by the Office of Management
and Budget.93
Finally, although the Chamber report focused primarily on cases
that were settled by scheduling agreements and brought against the EPA
and the Department of the Interior, the Chamber expressed concerns that
the litigation tactic could be used more frequently to reach substantive
agreements (instead of scheduling agreements94) and that the tactic could
be used against other agencies based on authority in the APA.95
B. Reforms Suggested by the United States Chamber of Commerce
The Chamber report included several concrete recommendations for
action to address the concerns raised in its report. In light of their concerns that affected parties are not aware of ongoing lawsuits and settlement negotiations, the Chamber recommended that federal agencies
should immediately inform the public, through their website or a notice
in the Federal Register, when they receive notice of “an advocacy
group’s” intent to sue the agency.96 According to the Chamber, this
would provide affected parties with a better opportunity to intervene in

91. Id. at 6. In addition, the Chamber alleged that agencies cannot make many changes to rules
after they are proposed, so it is important to involve a range of interested parties in the development
of the proposed rule, rather than drafting the rule “to accommodate the specific demands of a single
interest.” Id. at 25.
92. Id. at 23. Despite the charges, the Chamber does not cite any instances where agencies
failed to comply with those statutory or regulatory requirements.
93. Id. at 23.
94. Id. at 22.
95. Id. at 7. Most of the lawsuits that the Chamber report examined were brought under the
citizen suit provisions of various federal environmental laws, rather than the APA. The Chamber
expressed concerns, though, that lawsuits could be brought under the APA to challenge an agency’s
failure to issue regulations under other laws, based on a federal district court decision in California
that adopted that approach. Id. (citing Order Re Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Ctr. for
Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. 4:12-cv-04529-PJH (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012)).
96. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 28.
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the cases, prepare more thoughtful comments on any proposed settlements, or both.97
Regarding intervention, the Chamber recommended that courts apply a strong presumption in favor of allowing persons to intervene in
lawsuits.98 This presumption could be rebutted by a showing that the potential intervenor’s interests are adequately represented by the existing
parties in the action.99 Under the current rules, the intervenor has the
burden of proving that existing parties do not adequately represent its
interests, so the Chamber’s recommendation would turn the burden on its
head. In addition to recommending a strong presumption in favor of intervention, the Chamber recommended that judicial rules be amended to
provide that intervenors must be given the opportunity to be involved in
the settlement negotiations.100
The Chamber also recommended that agencies should be required
to submit a notice in the Federal Register when they have prepared a
consent decree or settlement agreement and that agencies provide a reasonable period for public comment, perhaps forty-five days, before filing
the agreement or decree with the court.101 Finally, the Chamber recommended more rigorous judicial oversight of the terms of settlement
agreements and consent decrees.102 Specifically, the Chamber recommended that courts “should review the statutory basis for agency actions
in consent decrees and settlement agreements in the same manner as if
they were adjudicating a case.”103
C. Congressional Reform Proposals
Representative Ben Quayle’s Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and
Settlements Act of 2012 was intended to impose significant procedural
and substantive restrictions on federal agencies when they enter into consent decrees or settlement agreements.104 Although that bill died in the
112th Congress, it was reintroduced in the 113th Congress as Senate Bill

97. Id.
98. Id. at 29.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 28.
102. Id. at 29.
103. Id.
104. See Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2012, H.R. 3862, 112th
Cong. (2012).

2014] Sue and Settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen Suit

907

714 and House Resolution 1493.105 Many provisions of the legislation
are similar to the recommendations of the Chamber.
First, the legislation provides that an agency must publish online a
notice of intent to sue or a complaint in a case involving the agency’s
failure to take an action required by law106 within fifteen days after receiving it.107 The legislation also establishes elaborate notice-andcomment requirements for consent decrees and settlement agreements in
a much wider range of cases—in any case where the decree or agreement
requires regulatory action that affects the rights of private persons other
than the persons suing or that affects the rights of a state, local, or tribal
government.108
In those cases, the legislation requires agencies to publish proposed
consent decrees or settlement agreements in the Federal Register and
online, along with a statement providing the statutory basis for the decree
or agreement and a description of the terms of the decree or agreement,
including whether it provides for attorney’s fees.109 After publishing the
notice, the legislation requires the agency to provide a sixty-day public
comment period and to prepare a record for the notice-and-comment process, which includes a summary of the comments and responses and an
index of all the documents in the record.110 The legislation prohibits
agencies from entering a consent decree or moving to dismiss an action
based on a settlement agreement until the agency complies with these
notice-and-comment requirements.111
The legislation imposes additional limits on the format of consent
decrees and settlement agreements in cases that require regulatory action
that affects states or private persons that are not parties. If the agreement
or decree requires an agency to take action by a specific date (like most
of the settlements in the Chamber report), the legislation requires the
105. See Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2013, H.R. 1493, 113th
Cong. (2013); S. 714, 113th Cong. (2013).
106. The legislation defines a “covered civil action” as a civil action
(A) seeking to compel agency action; (B) alleging that the agency is unlawfully withholding or unreasonably delaying an agency action relating to a regulatory action that would
affect the rights of (i) private persons other than the person bringing the action; or (ii) a
State, local, or tribal government; and (C) brought under (i) chapter 7 of title 5, United
States Code; or (ii) any other statute authorizing such an action.
H.R. 1493, § 2(2).
107. Id. § 3(a)(1).
108. Section 2(3) defines the scope of “covered consent decrees,” and section 2(5) defines the
scope of “covered settlement agreements.”
109. Id. § 3(d)(1).
110. Id. § 3(d)(2).
111. Id. § 3(a)(2).
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agency to inform the court of any required regulatory actions the agency
has not taken that the decree or agreement does not address, how the decree or agreement would affect the agency’s performance of those other
required actions, and why it is in the public interest to enter into the decree or agreement despite the effects on the performance of other required actions. The legislation also provides that when a settlement includes certain terms that were addressed in the 1986 Meese memo, the
head of the agency or the Attorney General must personally sign a certification approving those terms.112
The legislation also imposes restrictions on the settlement negotiation process. First, like the Chamber’s recommendation, the legislation
changes the rules for intervention in any lawsuit covered by the legislation and creates a rebuttable presumption that the interests of a person
filing a motion for intervention are not adequately represented by the
existing parties to the action.113 In addition to broadening the scope of
parties that are likely to be involved in the litigation, the legislation significantly changes the nature of the settlement negotiations by requiring
that negotiations must include all intervening parties and be “conducted
pursuant to the mediation or alternative dispute resolution program of the
court or by a district judge other than the presiding judge, magistrate
judge, or special master, as determined appropriate by the presiding
judge.”114
While the legislation does not incorporate the Chamber’s recommendations regarding the standard of review that a court should apply
when deciding whether to approve a consent decree,115 the legislation
creates a presumption that it is proper, when the court is reviewing a pro112. Id. § 3(e). The certification is required if the agreement includes a provision that
(i) converts into a nondiscretionary duty a discretionary authority of an agency to propose, promulgate, revise, or amend regulations; (ii) commits an agency to expend funds
that have not been appropriated and that have not been budgeted for the regulatory action
in question; (iii) commits an agency to seek a particular appropriation or budget authorization; (iv) divests an agency of discretion committed to the agency by statute or the
Constitution of the United States, without regard to whether the discretion was granted to
respond to changing circumstances, to make policy or managerial choices, or to protect
the rights of third parties; or (v) otherwise affords relief that the court could not enter under its own authority upon a final judgment in the civil action.
Id. § 3(e)(2)(A).
113. Id. § 3(b)(1).
114. Id. § 3(c).
115. Although it does not address the standard that a court should apply when deciding whether to initially approve a consent decree, the legislation requires courts to review consent decrees and
settlement agreements de novo when an agency moves a court to modify a decree or agreement on
the grounds that the terms in the settlement “are no longer fully in the public interest due to the obligations of the agency to fulfill other duties or due to changed facts and circumstances.” Id. § 4.
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posed consent decree or settlement agreement, to allow amicus participation by anyone who submitted comments on the proposed decree or
agreement.116
Finally, the legislation requires agencies to submit an annual report
to Congress that identifies the number, identity, and content of lawsuits
filed against the agency that are covered by the legislation as well as
consent decrees or settlements entered into by the agency that are covered by the legislation.117 For each consent decree or settlement agreement, the report must identify the statutory basis for the settlement and
the basis for any award of attorney’s fees or costs in those actions.118
IV. A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICS
The recommendations of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
proposed congressional legislation would provide significant roadblocks
to settlement of lawsuits brought against federal agencies when agencies
fail to carry out duties required by law, but the reforms would not reduce
the number of such lawsuits. Citizens play a vital role in enforcement of
the federal environmental laws when the government fails to act as required by law, and the proposed reforms would simply prolong the government’s ultimately futile defense of those lawsuits. Many of the concerns raised by the Chamber and other critics are overstated. To the extent that some of the concerns have merit, however, such concerns can be
addressed through more moderate reforms.
A. The Important Role of Citizen Enforcement
Citizen suits are a “quintessentially American legal process innovation.”119 Congress first authorized citizens to sue the government or other
persons who violate environmental laws when it included a citizen suit
provision in the Clean Air Act in 1970.120 Every major federal environmental law enacted since (other than FIFRA121) includes a citizen suit

116. Id. § 3(f)(1). The legislation also requires the court to ensure that the consent decree or
settlement agreement allows for sufficient time and incorporates adequate procedures for the agency
to comply with the APA, other statutes, or executive orders that impose requirements on rulemaking.
Id. § 3(f)(2).
117. Id. § 3(g).
118. Id.
119. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Three Economies: An Essay in Honor of Joseph Sax, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 411, 425 (1998).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012).
121. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2012).
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provision.122 Citizen suits serve several important purposes. First, citizen
enforcement ensures that congressional priorities are implemented when
other factors may limit federal or state enforcement of those priorities.123
Second, citizen enforcement promotes democratic ideals by enabling interested citizens to participate meaningfully in the formulation and implementation of environmental policy.124
Regarding the primary purpose of citizen enforcement, numerous
reports over several decades have documented chronic underenforcement or non-enforcement of environmental laws by federal or
state agencies.125 As Professor Buzz Thompson notes, the balance of political power shifts toward industry in the implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, as regulated entities will lobby hard against
penalties and enforcement, and without citizen enforcement, few would
advocate against leniency in enforcement.126 Further, he notes that because of the diffuse nature of harm caused by many environmental violations, citizens may frequently be unaware of such violations.127 In addition, when states are tasked with enforcing federal environmental laws,
as they are under the cooperative federalism approach adopted in many
of those laws, states have an added incentive to limit enforcement when
they feel that aggressive enforcement might encourage businesses to relocate to other states that are less rigorous in their enforcement of the
laws.128 Arguably, it is inappropriate to take those factors into account in
determining whether to enforce environmental laws.129
Political pressures are not the only factor that contributes to underenforcement or non-enforcement of environmental laws by federal and
state agencies. Environmental agencies at the federal and state levels are
frequently underfunded and understaffed.130 Thus, even if agencies have
the political will to enforce the laws more aggressively, they frequently
lack the necessary resources. When federal or state agencies lack the resources or the political will to enforce the environmental laws enacted by
Congress, citizen suit provisions allow citizens to step in and implement
congressional will. In fact, the mere threat of citizen litigation alters the
122. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Innovations in Environmental Policy: The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 192.
123. See id. at 198.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 191.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 202–03.
130. Id. at 191–92.
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political calculus for federal and state agencies and can motivate government enforcement.131
Although some critics, including the Chamber of Commerce in its
report,132 assert that citizen suits are motivated primarily by the opportunity to collect attorney’s fees, most studies conclude that citizen suits
frequently address significant violations of environmental laws and rarely address frivolous violations.133 The Chamber asserts that there has
been no meaningful oversight of citizen suits for over forty years because
jurisdiction rests with the congressional committee that oversees the substantive statute at issue rather than the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees, which have expertise and jurisdiction over granting “access
to federal courts.”134 However, that assertion exhibits the Chamber’s
fundamental misunderstanding of the central role of citizen suits in the
structure of the environmental statutes. To the extent that there are any
“abuses” of the citizen suit process, the congressional committees that
have jurisdiction over the environmental statutes are uniquely qualified
to evaluate the implementation of the citizen suit provisions in those
statutes.
Even if citizen suits had not been used so effectively to address
problems of chronic under- or non-enforcement of environmental laws,
the provisions would still be valuable because of the democracy benefits
noted above. Citizen suits provide interested persons with a “seat at the
table” in environmental policymaking and provide a process for ensuring
that their interests are represented.135 As Professor Thompson points out,
“procedure is often as important to members of the public as outcomes.”136

131. The citizen suit provisions in environmental laws generally (1) require citizens to notify
the defendants and the government before filing suit; (2) require citizens to wait a specific time
period, usually sixty days after giving notice, before filing a citizen suit; and (3) prohibit citizens
from filing a suit if the government is diligently prosecuting a civil action against a defendant for the
violation that is the subject of their lawsuit. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012);
Resource and Conservation Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (2012).
132. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 12 n.14.
133. See Thompson, supra note 122, at 203–04.
134. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
135. Thompson, supra note 122, at 210.
136. Id.
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B. A Response to the Chamber’s Criticisms
1. Agencies Are “Accepting” Lawsuits
In its report, the Chamber asserts that agencies intentionally relinquish their statutory authority when they “accept” lawsuits from outside
groups.137 The report suggests that agencies are colluding with environmental groups to provide them with a preferential role in setting environmental policy. As support for this assertion, the Chamber notes:
[T]he coordination between outside groups and agencies is aptly illustrated by a November 2010 sue and settle case where EPA and
an outside advocacy group filed a consent decree and a joint motion
to enter the consent decree with the court on the same day that the
advocacy group filed its complaint against the EPA.138

While the Chamber implies that this is evidence of collusion between the
parties, the Chamber conveniently fails to note that the environmental
laws require citizens to give defendants notice of intent to sue and that
they must wait for a specific period of time, usually sixty days, before
filing a lawsuit against the defendant.139 The notice requirement gives the
defendant an opportunity to come into compliance and gives federal and
state governments the opportunity to bring enforcement actions before
the plaintiff proceeds with suit against the defendant.140 It is not at all
surprising, therefore, that a plaintiff may negotiate a settlement with a
defendant before filing suit, without any collusion.141
While the Chamber tries to paint a picture of increased litigation by
environmental groups leading to collusive settlements with the EPA, a
recent Government Accountability Office study of environmental litigation against the EPA found “no discernible trend” in the number of lawsuits brought against the agency between 1995 and 2010.142 In fact, the
137. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
138. Id. at 11 n.12 (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Perciasepe, No. 12-5122, slip op. at 6 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 23, 2013)).
139. See supra note 131.
140. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2012); Resource and Conservation Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2012).
141. At hearings on H.R. 3862 (the 2012 legislation), John Cruden, who served as Deputy
Attorney General and other senior positions in the Environment and Natural Resources Division of
the Department of Justice, testified, “I am not aware of any instance of a settlement, and certainly
none I personally approved, that could remotely be described as ‘collusive.’” See H.R. REP. No. 112593, at 27 (2012) (dissenting views).
142. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-650, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION:
CASES AGAINST EPA AND ASSOCIATED COSTS OVER TIME 13 (2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11650.pdf.
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largest category of plaintiffs suing the EPA over the study period was
trade associations (25%), followed by private companies (23%), local
environmental and citizens groups (16%), and national environmental
groups (14%).143 While a change in presidential administration was identified as one factor that influences the number of lawsuits brought each
year and the type of plaintiffs who bring them, several other factors were
also identified as significant, including the passage of new regulations,
amendments to laws, and EPA’s failure to meet statutory deadlines.144
Over the fifteen-year period under study, almost 60% of the lawsuits
brought alleged violations of the 1990 Clean Air Act.145
The Chamber’s allegation that the agencies are “accepting” the lawsuits also implies that an agency’s decision to settle, instead of continuing to defend the lawsuit, is evidence of collusion or is, at least, improper. However, over 80% of the lawsuits addressed in the Chamber report
involve challenges to an agency’s failure to meet a statutory deadline or
take some other action required by law.146 In those cases, it is very easy
to prove that the agency has violated the law. Courts routinely reject
claims, like those advanced by the Food and Drug Administration in a
case147 cited by the Chamber,148 that the agency lacks the resources to act
by the statutorily mandated date or that it is administratively infeasible to
act by that date.149 Indeed, the House Judiciary Report on the Sunshine
for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2012 points out that
“plaintiffs may have strong cases on liability in these matters, giving
them substantial leverage over the defendant agencies.”150 Usually, therefore, the only issue in the litigation is the remedy for failing to act, and
statutes that impose deadlines on agency action rarely grant explicit authority to courts or agencies to modify those deadlines.151 In fashioning a
remedy, courts will frequently rely on equitable authority to grant agencies additional time to act, especially when meeting the existing deadlines would jeopardize the implementation of other essential programs or
where compliance with the deadlines is impossible.152 The court may set
143. Id. at 16.
144. Id. at 13.
145. Id. at 15.
146. See supra note 77.
147. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. 4:12-cv-04529-PJH (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012).
148. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
149. See Order Re Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 7–8, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. 4:12-cv-04529-PJH (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Summary Judgment Order],
available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/57-sj-decision_78315.pdf.
150. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-593, at 4, 27 (2012).
151. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 39, at 964.
152. Id. at 964–65.
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a deadline on its own, ask the agency to propose a new deadline, or simply order the agency to act expeditiously.153
Thus, when an agency is faced with a lawsuit based on its failure to
act in accordance with a statutory deadline, settlement is usually the most
appropriate solution. If the agency does not enter into a settlement
agreement, it expends additional financial and human resources defending a case that it will ultimately lose. In doing so, it increases its liability
for attorney’s fees when the plaintiff ultimately prevails in the litigation,154 and instead of maintaining control over the new deadline in a settlement, the agency faces the possibility that the court will establish a
new deadline either unilaterally or based on the recommendations of the
plaintiffs.155 The prolonged litigation also delays the time before the
agency ultimately takes the act that it has failed to take, which will likely
provide benefits to the environment, human health, or both. Through a
settlement, therefore, the agency maintains its control over setting a new
deadline, reduces its litigation costs and exposure to attorney’s fees, and
protects the environment and human health more expeditiously.
2. Agencies Are Improperly Limiting Their Discretion in Settlements
The Chamber report criticizes federal agencies, including the EPA,
on the ground that the agencies are improperly limiting their discretion
by agreeing to perform statutorily required duties by specified deadlines
in settlements and consent decrees. The criticism ignores two important
realities. First, in most of the suits addressed in the Chamber report, the
agencies had very little discretion to exercise, as Congress had required
the agencies to act before the lawsuits were brought. Congress set the
agency’s agenda and priority of resources, not the environmental challengers. Statutory deadlines shift agency resources away from programs

153. Id. at 965–66. In the Center for Food Safety case cited by the Chamber in its report, the
court ordered the parties to negotiate a deadline that was agreeable to the parties. See Summary
Judgment Order, supra note 149, at 10.
154. Many of the federal environmental laws authorize courts to award litigation costs, including attorney’s fees, to prevailing or substantially prevailing parties. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(d) (2012); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2012). The Clean
Air Act and Endangered Species Act are broader and authorize courts to award litigation costs, including attorneys fees to any party whenever the court determines an award is appropriate. See Clean
Air Act § 7604(d); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2012).
155. A court might impose a deadline that the agency cannot meet. See Sierra Club v. Jackson,
No. 01-1537(PLF), 2011 WL 181097 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2011). When the district court ordered the
EPA to issue the regulations on a very short schedule, the agency simultaneously issued the regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 15,608 (Mar. 21, 2011), and a notice of intent to reconsider the regulations, 76
Fed. Reg. 15,266 (Mar. 21, 2011).
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without deadlines to programs with deadlines.156 As Professors Gersen
and O’Connell note, “when Congress uses a [statutory] deadline, it is
usually to constrain agency actions that have a broad effect on powerfully situated political interests.”157
Whenever agencies settle lawsuits by agreeing to new deadlines for
action, regulated entities are receiving some benefit because the congressionally required deadline has been delayed. Nevertheless, as John
Walke, director of the Clean Air program at the Natural Resources Defense Council, pointed out, regulated entities would prefer that the agencies not take the actions required by law at all, rather than delay them.158
A Competitive Enterprise study found that between 1993 and 2013, the
EPA generally promulgated regulations for three programs under the
Clean Air Act about 2,072 days after their statutory deadlines.159 The
Chamber and regulated entities would prefer that the EPA and other
agencies persist in the non-enforcement of statutory obligations, rather
than agree to expeditious timetables when they miss congressional deadlines.
Second, the Chamber’s charge that agencies are improperly limiting
their discretion also ignores the reality that when agencies enter into settlement agreements and consent decrees, they are legitimately exercising
their discretion and not improperly limiting it. As noted above, the
Chamber’s criticism is likely based, in part, on the 1986 Meese memo,
which prohibited the federal government from entering into a consent
decree “that divests [a government official] of discretion” or “that converts into a mandatory duty the otherwise discretionary authority [of an
official] to revise, amend[,] or promulgate regulations.”160 The memo
was adopted shortly after the EPA entered into a consent decree with
several environmental groups that challenged the agency’s failure to regulate toxic water pollutants as required by the Clean Water Act.161 As
part of the consent decree, the agency agreed to implement a much different regulatory program to control toxic water pollution than was required.162 Although the decree required the EPA to apply standards and
156. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 39, at 973.
157. Id. at 942.
158. See Jessica Coomes, EPA Unable to Meet Rulemaking Deadlines Required by Clean Air
Act, Analysis Finds, 44 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2054 (July 12, 2013).
159. See Yeatman, supra note 39.
160. See Messe memo, supra note 80, at 3.
161. See Natural Res. Def. Counsel v. Train, 8 E.R.C. (BNA) 2120, 2122 (D.D.C. 1976), rev’d
in part on other grounds sub nom. Natural Res. Def. Counsel v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
162. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1033–35.
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undertake programs that were not required by the statute, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the settlement did not impermissibly interfere with the agency’s discretion.163
Judge Wilkey, in dissent, argued that courts could not approve consent
decrees that included conditions that courts could not impose if the case
went to trial.164 Attorney General Meese, in his 1986 memo, agreed with
Judge Wilkey’s dissenting opinion.165
As Professor Robert Percival has noted, virtually every commitment to take action, including an agreement to a revised schedule when
an agency misses a statutory deadline, will involve some restraint on an
agency’s exercise of discretion.166 However, in such cases, the agency’s
discretion is already considerably restrained by the statute that required
the agency’s delayed action. It is not clear, therefore, that a consent decree that establishes a new timetable to replace a missed statutory deadline is converting a discretionary duty into a mandatory duty.167
Notably, the Meese memo never prevented agencies from agreeing
to modify statutory deadlines in consent decrees or to otherwise limit
their discretion.168 In addition, the Meese memo was significantly modified more than a decade ago. In a 1999 memorandum, the Justice Department concluded that the Meese memo was based on policy considerations rather than legal considerations. It further declared that
the Attorney General is free to enter into settlements that . . . limit
the future exercise of Executive Branch discretion when that discretion has been conferred upon the Executive Branch pursuant to statute and there exists no independent statutory limitation on the authority of the Executive Branch to so limit the future exercise of that
discretion.169

The Department also concluded:
We do not believe . . . that Article III precludes the Executive
Branch from entering into judicially enforceable discretion limiting
settlements as a general matter or that Article III bars federal courts
163. See Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
164. Id. at 1131 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
165. See Meese memo, supra note 80, at 3.
166. See Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policymaking, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, 343.
167. In the parlance of the Meese memo. See id. at 342.
168. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1035.
169. See Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Raymond C. Fisher, Assoc. Att’y Gen., Authority of the United States to Enter Settlements Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch Discretion (June 15, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/consent_decrees2.htm.
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from entering consent decrees that limit Executive Branch discretion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a
court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.170

It seems clear, therefore, that agencies are not improperly limiting their
discretion when they enter into consent decrees that set new schedules to
replace lapsed statutory deadlines. Instead, as Professor Gaba has noted,
it is more appropriate to characterize the agency’s action as an exercise
of discretion rather than an interference or limitation of discretion.171
3. Settlements Violate Separation-of-Powers Principles and
Lead to Poor Quality Rules
The Chamber also raised separation-of-powers concerns regarding
agency settlements. Specifically, the Chamber argued that by agreeing to
new deadlines to take action required by law, the Executive Branch is
expanding the authority of agencies at the expense of congressional oversight.172 Similarly, it argued that agencies are improperly using congressionally appropriated funds to achieve the demands of private parties
when they enter into such agreements.173
However, the fundamental point that the Chamber ignores in making both of those arguments is that in these settlements, the litigants are
forcing the agencies to act in a way that is as close to congressional intent as possible—in light of the fact that the agencies have already violated that intent. To the extent that an agreement requires an agency to
devote resources to a lapsed statutory deadline, Congress wanted those
resources expended to meet the deadline at an earlier time and, barring
any statutory amendment, still wants the agency to meet that deadline as
expeditiously as possible. The agreements are implementing, rather than
frustrating, congressional intent. If Congress no longer feels it necessary
for agencies to meet statutory deadlines, it can eliminate or change the
deadlines, or it can limit the agencies’ use of funds to implement those
statutorily mandated obligations by including riders—additional provisions that, despite generally being unpassable on their own and lacking in
connection to the main subject of a bill, are added to the bill prior to passage—in appropriations legislation for the agencies.
170. Id. Nevertheless, federal regulations still require assistant attorneys general to refer to the
deputy attorney general or the associate attorney general a “proposed settlement [that] converts into
a mandatory duty the otherwise discretionary authority of a department or agency to promulgate,
revise, or rescind regulations.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.160 (2013).
171. Gaba, supra note 32, at 1262.
172. See source cited supra note 82 and accompanying text.
173. See source cited supra note 83 and accompanying text.

918

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:891

The Chamber also raised concerns that agencies frequently set unrealistic deadlines in settlements, which leads to poor quality rules and
which diverts resources from other actions, leading to poor quality decision making with regard to those actions.174 However, the Chamber ignores the fact that agencies have significant incentives to avoid entering
into agreements that establish unrealistically short deadlines. For example, various studies have suggested that 75% of the EPA’s major rules
are challenged in court175 and that the challenged rules are invalidated, to
some extent, in 30%–50% of those cases.176 Almost half of the lawsuits
against the EPA are brought by businesses and trade organizations.177
When an agency regulation is challenged, the agency must be able to
defend the rule or action as reasonable, within the agency’s authority,
and that it was adopted in accordance with the procedures required by
law.178 The EPA and other litigation-averse agencies have strong incentives to devote as much time as is necessary to decision making in order
to make a rule or decision that will withstand judicial scrutiny. Although
the APA only requires a minimal notice-and-comment period, it generally takes the EPA many years to finalize rules after the agency publishes
an initial notice of proposed rulemaking.179 Therefore, the EPA and other
agencies will be reluctant to enter into settlement agreements with challengers that require the agencies to act within an unrealistically short
time frame.
4. Settlements Limit the Opportunities for Participation by Non-Parties
Who Are Affected by the Settlements and by the Public
In addition to challenges regarding the terms of settlement agreements and consent decrees, the Chamber raised several concerns challenging the procedures used to negotiate and finalize those agreements.
One of the central concerns that the Chamber raised was that non-parties
and the public who are affected by agencies’ settlements do not have adequate opportunities to participate in the negotiation and review of those
174. See source cited supra note 84 and accompanying text.
175. See Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise: An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 769, 771 (2008) (finding that 75% of EPA’s economically
significant rules finalized between 2001 and 2005 were challenged in court and citing former EPA
administrator’s statement that 80% of EPA’s rules were challenged).
176. Id. at 769.
177. See supra text accompanying note 143.
178. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (judicial review standards of the APA).
179. See Johnson, supra note 175, at 767, 770 (finding that it took EPA an average of one and
a half to two years to finalize the rules examined in the study and citing other studies that found that
it took agencies an average of three to five years to finalize rules).
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agreements.180 However, in cases where the agency is simply agreeing to
a new deadline to replace a statutory deadline that the agency missed, the
only harm that non-parties suffer is a lost opportunity to lobby agencies
to further delay those actions.181
Even in cases where agencies enter into substantive agreements, as
opposed to scheduling agreements, the rules that the agency negotiates as
part of the settlement agreement or consent decree generally must be
adopted through the notice-and-comment process, so non-parties will
have ample opportunity to participate in the decision-making process
before the agency takes final action.182 While environmental groups may
have greater access to agencies in developing the proposal during the
settlement negotiations, such access could counterbalance, to some extent, the monumental imbalance that normally exists in favor of industry
during the development of proposed rules outside of the litigation context.183
As Professor Wagner notes, since courts have limited the changes
that agencies can make to proposed rules during the notice-and-comment
process, agencies have a strong incentive to work closely with the regulated community before issuing a proposed rule. During this period, the
agency can gather the information necessary to develop a legally defensible rule that will require minimal changes during the notice-andcomment period.184 Most of the policymaking and true regulatory work
occur during the rule-development stage, which is also a time when there
are very few limits on discussions between agencies and third parties,
and few requirements for disclosure of those contacts.185
Professor Wagner’s study of the EPA’s development of hazardous
air pollution regulations found that industry representatives had, on average, 170 times more communications with the EPA than public interest
organizations during the rule-development stage and ten times more
communications with the EPA than states during that stage.186 Further,
she indicated that “there are several accounts of industry not only com180. See sources cited supra note 86 and accompanying text.
181. While there may be non-parties who would advocate for shorter deadlines, the concerns
that the Chamber raises regarding the unrealistically short deadlines that agencies enter into suggest
that the Chamber is not concerned with the potential silencing of those voices. See supra text accompanying note 84. Nevertheless, non-parties whose interests are not adequately represented by the
parties to the litigation should be able to intervene in the proceedings under normal rules of intervention. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
182. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1267–68.
183. See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 52, at 110–13, 124–27.
184. Id. at 110–11.
185. Id. at 112; see also Gaba, supra note 32, at 1269.
186. See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 52, at 124–25.
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menting, but actually drafting the proposed rule as part of these preNPRM [notice of proposed rulemaking] discussions.”187 Consequently, if
environmental groups have some increased access to agencies when
agencies are developing a proposed rule as part of a settlement of a lawsuit, it may simply counterbalance the advantage that industry representatives may have already had at an earlier stage in the development of
the rule.
However, it is not necessary to speculate whether preferential access for environmental groups during settlement negotiations would be
defensible because existing procedures for intervention provide significant opportunities for non-parties to be involved in the lawsuits brought
by environmental groups. The Chamber asserted, however, that industries and other non-parties who may be affected by the settlement of lawsuits brought by environmental groups against agencies often lack the
opportunity to participate in those lawsuits because they are not aware
that the lawsuits have been filed, they have been denied opportunities to
intervene, or they are not aware that the settlement agreements or consent
decrees in the lawsuits are being finalized.188
While the Chamber asserted that participation in sue and settle lawsuits is difficult because many persons affected by the lawsuits are not
aware that the lawsuits have been filed, almost 85% of the seventy-one
lawsuits addressed in the Chamber’s report were against the EPA, and as
the Chamber noted in a footnote in its report, the EPA publishes all of
the notices of intent to sue that it receives on its website.189 Of the remaining eleven lawsuits, all except two were filed against either the Department of the Interior or one of the bureaus within the Department of
the Interior, and they post many of the notices of intent to sue that they
receive on their websites as well.190
Regarding intervention, Professor Gaba raised concerns almost
three decades ago that were similar to the Chamber’s when he suggested
that a liberal reading of the federal rules on intervention was necessary to
protect the interests of persons who were being excluded from agency
settlement negotiations that developed substantive rules for notice-andcomment rulemaking.191 However, Gaba was focusing on participation in
187. Id. at 127.
188. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 22–25.
189. Id. at 6 n.6. As of December 1, 2013, sixty of seventy-one cases cited were brought
against the EPA. See Notices of Intent to Sue the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ogc/noi.html (last updated Feb. 3, 2014).
190. See, e.g., Candidate Conservation, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/
southeast/candidateconservation/esaactions.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2013).
191. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1277–78.
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litigation that leads to substantive agreements, rather than scheduling
agreements.192 Significantly, even with regard to negotiations for substantive agreements, Gaba did not advocate for a change in the existing
rules for intervention, but merely a liberal reading of those rules.193
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that
[o]n timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene
who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that
is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent
that interest.194

The burden on the movant is minimal, as the Supreme Court has held
that the movant must merely show that the representation of her interest
“may be” inadequate.195 Generally, though, the federal rules regarding
intervention as a right are construed liberally, and any doubt regarding
adequacy of representation is resolved in favor of the proposed
intervenor.196
Intervention is still possible even when the intervenor and existing
parties are seeking the same ultimate result, as long as the intervenor will
raise issues that the existing parties are unlikely to raise.197 It is not surprising, therefore, that intervention was denied in only two of the seventy-one cases that were included in the Chamber’s study.198 In comparison, more than 100 persons or entities successfully intervened in those
seventy-one cases.199
The American Legislative Exchange Council raised intervention
concerns similar to those expressed by the Chamber when it alleged in a
report that the EPA opposes the involvement of states in settlement nego-

192. See id. at 1241–43.
193. Id. at 1277–78.
194. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
195. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972) (emphasis
added).
196. See 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 24.03(1)(a), (4)(a)(i) (3d
ed. 1999) [hereinafter MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
197. Id. ¶ 24.03(4)(a)(i).
198. The Chamber of Commerce identified seventy-one lawsuits as sue and settle cases resulting in new rules and agency actions in its report. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 30–40. Of those lawsuits, the court denied a motion to intervene in only
two cases: Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kraft, No. 11-06059 (N.D. Cal. 2011) and Defenders of
Wildlife v. Jackson, No. 10-01915 (D.D.C. 2010).
199. See Stephen M. Johnson, Intervenors in Sue and Settle Lawsuits, MERCER L.,
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/interveners.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
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tiations in sue and settle cases.200 However, the cases that ALEC cites in
the report hardly demonstrate a pattern of EPA opposition to state involvement. In the first case cited in the report, Wildearth Guardians v.
Jackson,201 the EPA opposed the state of North Dakota’s motion to intervene in the lawsuit because (1) the consent decree the State sought to
challenge had been published in the Federal Register for comment; (2)
the State did not submit any comments on the proposed decree; (3) the
decree had been entered by the court several months earlier; and (4) there
was no ongoing litigation in which to intervene.202
In the other case cited, Fowler v. EPA, the EPA offered to provide
the state agencies with regular briefings on settlement negotiations and
an opportunity to voice any concerns over such negotiations, although it
opposed an order that would require the state agencies to participate in
the negotiations since the intervening state agencies ultimately had no
power to veto a settlement of which they did not approve, and inclusion
of the intervenors could delay and complicate the settlement negotiations.203 The court agreed with the EPA and issued an order requiring
regular briefings in lieu of participation by the intervenors in the settlement negotiations.204
In addition to the concerns regarding lack of notice and opportunity
to intervene in suits, the Chamber complained that persons who would be
most affected by settlements did not have notice or an opportunity to
comment on proposed consent decrees or settlement agreements.205
However, fifty of the seventy-one lawsuits (70%) addressed in the
Chamber report were lawsuits filed under the Clean Air Act.206 The
200. See ALEC, STATE SOVEREIGNTY REPORT, supra note 14, at 6–7.
201. No. 4:09-CV-02453-CW (N.D. Cal. 2009).
202. See Defendant’s Opposition to North Dakota’s Motion to Intervene and Motion to Show
Cause at 2–5, WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 4:09-CV-02453-CW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011).
203. The ALEC report cites Fowler v. EPA, No. 1:09-cv-00005-CKK (D.D.C. 2005), docket
document 33. See ALEC, STATE SOVEREIGNTY REPORT, supra note 14, at 7 n.18.
204. See Order, Fowler v. EPA, No. 1:09-cv-00005-CKK (D.D.C. 2005).
205. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23–25.
206. The Clean Air Act cases listed in the Chamber report include the following: Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, No. 08-1277 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, No. 12-00243 (D.D.C.
2012); Am. Nurses Ass’n v. Jackson, No. 08-02198 (D.D.C. 2009); Ass’n of Irritated Residents v.
EPA, No. 10-03051 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, No. 09-01890 (N.D. Cal.
2009); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, No. 11-06059 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Colo. Citizens Against
Toxic Waste, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 08-01787 (D. Colo. 2009); Comite Civico del Valle, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 10-00946 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Comite Civico del Valle, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 09-04095 (N.D.
Cal. 2009); Comite Civico del Valle, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 10-02859 (N.D. Cal. 2010); El Comite
Para El Bienestar De Earlimart v. EPA, No. 11-03779 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Jackson, No. 11-04492 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Ky. Envtl. Found. v. Jackson, No. 10-01814 (D.D.C. 2011); Ky.
Envtl. Found. v. Jackson, No. 11-01253 (D.D.C. 2012); La. Envtl. Action Network v. Jackson, No.
09-01333 (D.D.C. 2010); Mossville Envtl. Action NOW v. Jackson, No. 08-01803 (D.D.C. 2009);
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Clean Air Act includes a provision that requires the federal government
to publish a notice in the Federal Register whenever a federal agency is
proposing to enter into a consent decree or settlement agreement “of any
kind” under the Act and to allow persons to submit comments on the
agreement or decree for thirty days before the government can file the
agreement or decree with a court.207 Thus, in almost three-fourths of the
cases in the Chamber’s study, the EPA provided notice and an opportunity for comment on the decree or agreement pursuant to an existing statutory obligation. The Superfund law and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA)—the federal hazardous waste law—also include
provisions that require the EPA to provide notice and an opportunity for
comment before finalizing consent decrees or settlement agreements in
certain situations.208 Further, the Environment and Natural Resources
Division of the Department of Justice, which represents the EPA, the
Department of Interior, and most federal agencies in litigation, posts proposed consent decrees on its website as well as in the Federal Register.209

Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Jackson, No. 11-01548 (D.D.C. 2011); Natural Res. Def. Council
v. EPA, No. 10-06029 (C.D. Cal. 2010); New York v. EPA, No. 06-1322 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Portland
Cement Ass’n v. EPA, No. 07-1046 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 10-04060 (N.D.
Cal. 2011); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 11-03106 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 1001954 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Sierra Club v. EPA, 09-00218 (D.D.C. 2009); Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 0800424 (D.D.C. 2012); Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 10-01541 (D.D.C. 2011); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No.
10-00133 (D.D.C. 2010); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 09-00152 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Sierra Club v.
Jackson, No. 11-02000 (D.D.C. 2012); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 10-02112 (D.D.C. 2011); Sierra
Club v. Jackson, No. 01-01537 (D.D.C. 2003); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 12-00012 (D.D.C. 2012);
Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 10-00889 (D.D.C. 2010); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 11-02180 (D.D.C.
2012); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 11-00035 (D.D.C. 2011); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 12-00013
(D.D.C. 2012); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 12-00705 (D.D.C. 2012); Sierra Club v. Jackson, No.
11-00100 (D.D.C. 2011); WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 10-04603 (N.D. Cal. 2011);
WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 11-01661 (D. Ariz. 2011); WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson,
No. 11-02205 (N.D. Cal. 2011); WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 09-02148 (D. Colo. 2010);
WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 09-00089 (D.D.C. 2009); WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson,
No. 09-02453 (N.D. Cal. 2010); WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 11-00190 (N.D. Cal. 2011);
WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 11-00001 (D. Colo. 2011); WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson,
No. 09-02109 (D. Colo. 2009); WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 10-01218 (D. Colo. 2010); and
WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 12-00754 (D. Colo. 2012). The Chamber report also lists an
additional Clean Air Act case without a case caption, simply titled “Sierra Club filed a notice of
intent to file a lawsuit,” which settled on December 19, 2011.
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2012).
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2), (i) (Superfund—thirty-day comment period for various settlements); 42 U.S.C. § 6973(d) (RCRA—comment period for settlements involving imminent hazards).
209. See Proposed Consent Decrees, U.S. DEP’T JUST., ENV’T & NAT. RESOURCES DIVISION,
http://www.justice.gov/enrd/Consent_Decrees.html (last updated March 2014).
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5. Settlements Allow Agencies to Avoid Procedures Required
by the APA and Other Laws, and Executive Orders That
Govern Agency Rulemaking
Although most of the lawsuits in the Chamber’s study were settled
through scheduling agreements rather than substantive agreements, the
Chamber alleged that federal agencies were avoiding procedures required
by the APA in the small set of cases that were resolved through substantive agreements.210 However, in most settlement agreements, the federal
government merely agrees to adopt a particular approach as a proposed
rule, which is subject to all of the notice-and-comment requirements of
the APA.211 Indeed, when an agency attempts to avoid the notice and
comment requirements of the APA by adopting substantive policies
through a consent decree or settlement agreement, courts will invalidate
the agreement or decree, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did in
Conservation Northwest v. Sherman,212 which the Chamber cited in its
report.213
When the EPA or any other agency enters into a substantive agreement with challengers and issues a notice of proposed rulemaking to implement that agreement, any interested persons can participate in the
rulemaking process, regardless of whether they were involved in the litigation that led to the proposed rulemaking. Moreover, any person who is
dissatisfied with the final rule adopted by the agency through that process can sue the agency in accordance with the APA or other statutory
authority. In fact, numerous studies have found that in the normal noticeand-comment rulemaking process, industry representatives play a significantly greater role than environmental groups, which the Chamber asserts is unfairly influencing the development of rules.214 In Professor
210. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. The Chamber
does not raise this criticism with regard to the lawsuits that are settled via scheduling agreements,
because the Administrative Procedure Act does not impose any procedural requirements on agencies
when agencies are setting a new deadline to act after the agency has missed a statutory deadline.
211. See source cited supra note 42 and accompanying text.
212. 715 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2013), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/
2013/04/25/11-35729.pdf.
213. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8. The Ninth
Circuit invalidated a consent decree entered by the district court because the decree made changes to
a Forest Plan that was required to be made through rulemaking. See Conservation Nw., 715 F.3d at
1187–88.
214. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133 (2006) (finding, in a review
of ten rules from each of four agencies, including the EPA, that business interests submitted more
than 57% of the comments, as compared to 22% from non-governmental organizations and 6% from
public interest groups); see also Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 52, at 129 (citing a study by
Professor Cary Coglianese of twenty-five significant EPA rules in which Professor Coglianese found
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Wagner’s study of the EPA’s hazardous air pollution regulations, she
found that industry representatives participated in the notice-andcomment process for all ninety of the standards, while public interest
organizations participated in the process for fewer than half of the standards.215 Further, she found that 81% of the comments submitted during
the rulemaking process came from industry representatives, compared to
4% submitted by public-interest organizations.216
The Chamber alleged that opportunities for participation in the notice-and-comment process after agencies settle lawsuits with substantive
agreements is a sham because the agencies have a strong incentive to
finalize the proposed rules without significant changes so that the underlying lawsuit will be dismissed.217 Professors Gaba and Rossi raised
similar concerns regarding rulemaking settlements in other contexts.218
However, Professor Gaba stressed that even if an agency may have
an incentive to finalize the rule in the same form as proposed, this subtle
bias would not violate the APA because it does not require an impartial
decision maker in the development of rules.219 Similarly, since procedural due process limits normally do not apply to rulemaking, due process
would not prohibit any subtle bias in the agency toward finalizing the
rule as proposed.220 However, the normal requirements of the APA, including the standards of review, would apply to the agency’s decision.
Thus, the agency would have to justify its decision as reasonable in light
of the comments that it received (and in light of all of the information
before the agency).221 Further, because the APA requires agencies to
provide a concise general statement of the basis and purpose of final
rules, the agency would not be able to ignore important issues or factors
raised by commenters during the notice-and-comment process.222
that businesses participated in 96% of the rules, while national environmental groups participated in
less than half (44%)).
215. See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 52, at 128.
216. Id. at 128–29.
217. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 24–25.
218. See supra Part II.
219. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1256–57.
220. Id. at 1257–58.
221. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (authorizing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law”). For cases describing the arbitrary and capricious standard as
applied to review of agency rulemaking, see, for example, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) and Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97–98 (1983).
222. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). For cases describing the obligation of agencies to respond
to major issues of policy raised by commenters, see Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 784 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (while an agency is not required to respond to every single comment, an agency’s decision
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In addition to these reasons, in light of the significant advantage industry groups possess in the notice-and-comment rulemaking process
and in the normal pre-rule development process,223 the Chamber’s claim
that sue and settle lawsuits avoid the procedural protections of the APA
lacks merit.
The Chamber also asserted that the consent decrees and settlement
agreements provided insufficient time for agencies to comply with the
regulatory review requirements of the Office of Management and Budget, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Unfunded Mandates Act, and several executive orders.224 However, the Chamber did not cite any specific
instance in which agencies did not comply with those laws or requirements.
C. Shortcomings of Proposed Policy Recommendations
Although the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlement Acts
of 2012225 and 2013226 were introduced prior to the Chamber’s report,
they include provisions that target many of the concerns raised in the
report. Even if the concerns raised by the Chamber were weightier than
they are, the proposed legislation is much more restrictive than necessary.
1. Intervention Reforms
The proposed legislation shifts the burden of proof regarding intervention by creating a rebuttable presumption that the interests of a person
seeking intervention are not adequately represented by the existing parties to the litigation. However, as noted above, the rules regarding intervention are already quite lenient, and as Professor Peter Appel has noted,
courts have additional incentives, due to rules of appellate procedure, to

may be invalidated as arbitrary and capricious if the failure to respond to comments demonstrates
that the agency’s decision was not based on a consideration of the relevant factors); Independent
U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (concise general statement “should indicate the major issues of policy that were raised in the proceedings and explain why
the agency decided to respond to these issues as it did”); and S. Carolina v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 886
(4th Cir. 1983) (agency’s explanation must “enable a reviewing court to see what major issues of
policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them the way it
did”).
223. See sources cited supra notes 185–87, 214–16 and accompanying text.
224. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
225. H.R. 3862, 112th Cong. (2012).
226. H.R. 1493, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 714, 113th Cong. (2013).
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grant motions to intervene without any change in the existing rules.227
Specifically, Professor Appel writes:
[I]f a district court denies intervention, the dissatisfied applicant can
appeal immediately. If a district court grants intervention, however,
no party can appeal that order until final judgment. Thus, the district
court faced with a motion for intervention has two choices. The
court can deny the motion and face the substantial possibility of an
appeal, which could later disrupt the proceedings if the court of appeals reverses. On the other hand, the court can grant the motion
and simply bear the additional aggravation of having the intervenor
participate without the possibility of immediate appellate review
and a greatly reduced chance that the appellate court will even review the intervention decision.228

Furthermore, even without changes to the rules on intervention, Professor Appel points out that in many cases, the parties to a lawsuit have incentives to allow non-parties to intervene in their litigation.229 He notes
that allowing non-parties to intervene could increase the likelihood that
they will accept the solution agreed upon in the settlement and decrease
the likelihood that they will challenge the implementation of that decision.230 This would seem to be a significant incentive for the EPA, in
light of the frequency of challenges to the rules it adopts.231
Conversely, Professor Appel argues that broad intervention rules
impose significant costs on courts and litigants. Broad intervention rules
complicate and delay litigation and can significantly increase financial
and resource costs, as the parties must respond to additional arguments,
demands for discovery, and witnesses from the intervenors. Further, the
court must listen to and evaluate the claims of additional parties and
manage the sprawling litigation.232 Professor Appel also notes that “often
additional voices can drown out the effective presentation of argument.”233 Moreover, he argues that the existing intervention rules have
reached far beyond their intended audience and that the historical purpose of the rules was to protect the rights of persons that had “such a

227. See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm,
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 279–82, 292–93 (2000).
228. Id. at 293.
229. Id. at 300–01.
230. Id. at 300.
231. See source cited supra note 175 and accompanying text.
232. See Appel, supra note 227, at 279, 301–02.
233. Id. at 298.
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pronounced interest in the litigation that litigating that interest away
would probably present due process problems.”234
Writing several years earlier, Professor Percival suggested that intervention rules were adequate to protect the interests of regulated entities concerned about agencies settling lawsuits that might affect them.235
Professor Percival pointed out that rules on intervention and notice may
be inadequate to protect the interests of some poorly organized groups—
especially those lacking significant financial resource—but that they adequately protected most regulated entities.236 He also noted that even if
poorly organized groups had more notice and opportunities to become
involved, they would still lack the organization and resources necessary
to effectively participate in the development of the settlement agreements.237 Even if the current legislation were focused on protecting the
interests of those non-parties—which it is not—the legislation provides
no support to those groups to facilitate meaningful participation in the
settlement process. Professor Appel raised similar concerns when he
suggested that the goals of supporters of broad intervention rules for public law litigation could be met by the appointment of guardians ad litem,
special masters, or experts, rather than intervenors, to protect the interests of the public or non-parties that might be affected by the settlement
of the litigation.238
Since the existing rules do not seem to impose significant roadblocks to intervention (if the Chamber’s study is any indication), and
since broader rules could impose significant costs on courts and litigants,
it is unnecessary to expand the intervention rules as the proposed legislation would require. The proposed legislation requires that settlement negotiations must include all intervening parties and, more importantly,
that the negotiations must be conducted pursuant to a mediation or alternative dispute resolution program, or by a judge, magistrate judge, or
master appointed by the presiding judge.239 While mediation and alternative dispute resolution are valuable tools when used in appropriate circumstances, it is not necessary to subject settlement negotiations to that
degree of formality in every case. In many cases, requiring the parties to
engage in mediation would needlessly divert time and resources from the
settlement process. The additional procedural limitations on settlement
234. Id. at 295.
235. See Percival, supra note 166, at 349.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Appel, supra note 227, at 299.
239. See H.R. 1493, 113th Cong. § 3(c) (2013).
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negotiations in the proposed legislation would more likely obstruct and
delay those negotiations than facilitate them.
2. Notice Reforms
The proposed legislation also establishes elaborate notice-andcomment requirements for consent decrees and settlement agreements in
a wide range of cases brought against federal agencies.240 First, the legislation requires agencies to publish proposed consent decrees or settlement agreements in the Federal Register and online, along with a statement providing the statutory basis for the decree or agreement and a description of the terms of the decree or agreement, including whether it
provides for attorney’s fees.241 After publishing the notice, the legislation
requires the agency to provide a sixty-day public comment period and
prepare a record for the notice-and-comment process that includes a
summary of the comments and responses, and an index of all of the documents in the record.242 Since notice-and-comment rulemaking is the
paradigm of notice-and-comment proceedings in administrative law, it is
useful to compare the proposed legislative requirements to the APA’s
requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking.243
Significantly, the proposed sixty-day comment period is twice as
long as the comment period required by the APA for notice-andcomment rulemaking.244 Similarly, the procedures that the proposed legislation imposes on agencies regarding their duty to document and respond to comments are far more onerous than those imposed by the
APA. The APA does not require agencies to prepare official records of
notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings245 and does not explicitly
require agencies to prepare a summary of the comments and responses in
the proceedings.246 The timing of the comment period in the proposed
240. See sources cited supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
241. See H.R. 1493, § 3(d)(1).
242. Id. § 3(d)(2).
243. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
244. Id. § 553(d).
245. The APA requires agencies to prepare records for decisions made through formal rulemaking or formal adjudication but not for decisions made through informal procedures. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(e) (2012).
246. See, e.g., Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[APA § 553] has
never been interpreted to require the agency to respond to every comment, or to analyze every issue
or alternative raised by the comments, no matter how insubstantial.” (quoting Thompson v. Clark,
741 F.2d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (concise general statement “need not be an exhaustive, detailed account of every
aspect of the rulemaking proceedings; it is not meant to be the more elaborate document, complete
with findings of fact and conclusions of law, that is required in an on-the-record rulemaking.”); S.
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legislation is also twice as long as the comment periods required for consent decrees and settlement agreements by the Clean Air Act247 and the
Superfund law,248 and neither of these laws impose such detailed response and recording requirements on the agency to respond to comments and prepare an official record of the notice-and-comment process.249 Like other provisions of the proposed legislation, these provisions seem to be designed to delay and obstruct settlement, rather than to
increase transparency in the process.
Second, in addition to the comment and record-keeping requirements discussed above, the proposed legislation provides that if an
agreement or decree requires an agency to take action by a specific date,
the agency must inform the court of any required regulatory actions the
agency has not taken that the settlement does not address, how the decree
or agreement would affect the agency’s performance of those other required actions, and why it is in the public interest to enter into the decree
or agreement despite the effects on the performance of other required
actions.250 This reporting requirement is both broad and amorphous.
First, it requires the agency to identify all actions that the agency is required to take under any law by a specific date, regardless of whether the
settlement or decree would have any effect on the performance of those
duties.251 One could imagine that this requirement would be rather cumbersome for an agency like the EPA, which is required to take hundreds
of actions by statutory deadlines.252 Second, at the time of the settlement
agreement or decree, it may be unclear what precise effect, if any, compliance with the new deadline in the settlement will have on performance
Carolina v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 886 (4th Cir. 1983) (“There is no obligation to make references in
the agency explanation to all the specific issues raised in comments.” (internal citation omitted)).
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2012) (30 day comment period).
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2), (i) (2012) (thirty-day comment period). The proposal is also
fifteen days longer than the time period suggested by the Chamber of Commerce. See CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 28.
249. The Clean Air Act does not specify a procedure that the EPA must follow in reviewing
comments, but provides generally that “[t]he Administrator or the Attorney General, as appropriate,
shall promptly consider any such written comments and may withdraw or withhold his consent to the
proposed order or agreement if the comments disclose facts or considerations which indicate that
such consent is inappropriate, improper, inadequate, or inconsistent with the requirements of this
chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2012). The notice-and-comment provisions of Superfund are structured in a similar manner. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2), (i).
250. See H.R. 1493, 113th Cong. § 3(d)(4) (2013).
251. Id.
252. The Competitive Enterprise Institute study referenced earlier in this article indicated that
EPA is currently subject to 322 statutory deadlines for just three programs in the Clean Air Act. See
Yeatman, supra note 39. Similarly, the Gersen study referenced earlier in this Article noted that the
EPA was required to comply with over 1,000 statutory deadlines between 1988 and 2003. See
Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 39, at 940.
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of the hundreds of other statutory obligations of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency is required to speculate on what those effects might be
and argue, based on those speculative effects, that the agreement or decree is in the public interest.253
It is unusual to require courts to supervise the discretionary allocation of scarce resources in this manner. Indeed, when the Food and Drug
Administration refused, in response to petitions from prisoners sentenced
to death by lethal injection, to bring enforcement actions under the Food
and Drug Act to prevent the use of the lethal injection drugs, the Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, held that the agency’s decision
could not be reviewed under the APA because it was committed to agency discretion by law.254 In justifying its decision, the Court wrote:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation
has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this
violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it
acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits
the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has
enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally
cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is
charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the
courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.255

Just as the Supreme Court recognized that an agency is in the best position to determine the optimal allocation of limited resources when it has
the discretion to bring enforcement actions, Congress should not require
courts to review and second-guess an agency’s decisions regarding allocation of scarce resources when the agency agrees to a new deadline in a
settlement agreement to replace a lapsed statutory deadline.
3. Judicial Review Reforms
Congress and the Chamber of Commerce have also proposed
changes to the judicial role in the review and approval of consent decrees
and settlement agreements. The proposed legislation would require
courts to review consent decrees and settlement agreements to ensure
that any deadlines included provide sufficient time for agencies to com253. See H.R. 1493, § 3(d)(4).
254. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
255. Id. at 831–32.
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ply with the APA and with rulemaking requirements in other laws and
executive orders.256 Although this is not a burdensome requirement, there
is no evidence that prior settlement agreements were deficient in that regard.257 In addition, while not burdensome, the requirement is not costless.
Any expansion of the judicial review of consent decrees and settlement agreements will impose costs on the parties to gather and provide
information to the court so it can evaluate compliance with new requirements, and it will impose costs on the court to evaluate that information.258 If courts are more likely to reject settlements based on new
requirements or under expanded review authority, parties will need to
engage in additional rounds of settlement negotiations to develop settlements that will either meet the new requirements or withstand the new
review.259 Further, if parties cannot predict whether courts will approve
their settlements under expanded review procedures, parties may be less
likely to settle.260
The Chamber of Commerce recommends a more fundamental
change in judicial oversight than Congress has proposed, and argues that
courts “should review the statutory basis for agency actions in consent
decrees and settlement agreements in the same manner as if they were
adjudicating a case.”261 As an initial premise, it should be noted that absent legislative intervention, a plaintiff and defendant are ordinarily free
to settle their litigation without judicial approval.262 However, in many
cases, the parties may seek to invest the court with enforcement authority
over their agreement by entering a consent decree, or in some cases, legislation may require judicial oversight of agreements.263 Generally, when
courts review consent decrees, they evaluate whether the decree is in the
public interest and whether it was reached through good-faith bargaining.264 Although the decree must resolve a matter within the court’s jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held that a court is not barred from
entering a consent decree “merely because it might lack authority . . . to
256. See H.R. 1493, § 3(f)(2).
257. See source cited supra note 224 and accompanying text.
258. See Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 59 (1999).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 29.
262. See Weisburst, supra note 258, at 55.
263. Id. at 56.
264. See Joel S. Jacobs, Compromising NEPA?: The Interplay Between Settlement Agreements
and the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 117 (1995); Percival,
supra note 166, at 340.
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do so after a trial.”265 The Chamber’s proposal would, therefore, reverse
Supreme Court precedent and severely limit the authority of parties to
enter into settlement agreements and consent decrees.
Professors Gaba and Rossi raised concerns about limited judicial
review of consent decrees in the past, but their concerns arose in the context of substantive agreements, rather than scheduling agreements that
were the focus of the Chamber’s report, and the reforms that they suggested were more modest. For instance, Professor Gaba recognized that
where parties challenge an agency regulation and the agency agrees—via
consent decree or settlement agreement—to make specific substantive
changes to a rule and issue a new notice of proposed rulemaking, the settlement will often involve technical scientific or engineering details.
However, a court reviewing the decree will generally lack the expertise
to exercise independent judgment regarding those technical terms in the
decree.266 To ensure that such consent decrees are in the public interest,
Professor Gaba suggested that courts could require agencies to submit a
written explanation for their change in position from the regulation that
they initially adopted, which was challenged in the case.267 Professor
Gaba also suggested that courts should exercise “hard look” review when
reviewing challenges to regulations that were developed as a result of
settlement agreements or consent decrees that included commitments by
the agency to make specific substantive proposals.268
Professor Rossi also argued that more stringent judicial oversight of
consent decrees could provide greater protection for the public interest
and persons who are not parties to the decrees.269 Specifically, he suggested that courts should examine consent decrees at the time of approval
under the same hard look standard that Professor Gaba suggested should
apply to courts’ review of regulations that were adopted pursuant to substantive settlement agreements or consent decrees.270 Like Professor
Gaba, Rossi focused his concerns on substantive agreements, rather than
the scheduling agreements that were the primary focus of the Chamber’s
report. Professor Rossi recognized, though, that there is no clear legal
support for his proposal.271
The Chamber’s proposal is more extreme than those offered by Professors Rossi and Gaba and, to the extent that the proposed legislation
265. See Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 526 (1986).
266. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1278–79.
267. Id. at 1279.
268. Id. at 1281–82.
269. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1031, 1044.
270. Id. at 1055–57.
271. Id. at 1057.

934

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:891

addresses a standard of review for judicial oversight of consent decrees
and settlements, it adopts a more extreme position than that held by the
Rossi or Gaba proposals: the proposed legislation requires courts to review proposals to modify consent decrees de novo, without giving any
deference to agencies.272 Like the other reforms suggested by the Chamber and in the proposed legislation, the judicial reforms are more likely
to obstruct, delay, or prevent settlement of lawsuits than to protect the
public interest.
4. Effects of Proposed Reforms
When agencies are sued, especially in environmental cases, settlements are the predominant manner of resolution.273 Many settlements are
implemented through consent decrees because they provide distinct advantages over settlement agreements.274 As Professor Percival notes,
“Consent decrees streamline enforcement of settlement agreements because they are subject to continuing oversight and interpretation by a
single court. Their enforcement does not require the filing of an additional lawsuit to establish the validity of the settlement contract, and they
invoke ‘a flexible repertoire of enforcement measures.’”275
Regardless of whether the agreements are implemented in consent
decrees, settlements benefit agencies because they allow agencies to
maintain control over their resources and priorities, and avoid “judicial
interference with the remedial plan” that the agencies prefer to implement.276 By entering into settlements, an agency can avoid judgments
that may have broad, adverse impacts on other programs administered by
the agency.277 Further, an agency can preserve scarce resources and prevent delay in the implementation of its regulatory programs by entering
into settlements.278 Settlements also benefit society and courts by reducing the demands placed on courts and promoting quicker implementation
of regulatory programs.279 In light of those benefits, there is an overrid-

272. See H.R. 1493, 113th Cong. § 4.
273. See Percival, supra note 166, at 328.
274. Id. at 328, 335; Jacobs, supra note 264, at 116–17.
275. Percival, supra note 166, at 335 (quoting Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 523 n.13 (1986)).
276. Id. at 331; Jacobs, supra note 264, at 116, 154.
277. See Percival, supra note 166, at 331.
278. Id.; Jacobs, supra note 264, at 154.
279. See Percival, supra note 166, at 333. Professor Percival recognizes that settlements can
also have some disadvantages for society. For instance, he notes that settlement negotiations may be
so protracted in some cases that the cost of settlement is greater than the cost of litigation and that
settlement terms are likely to reflect the resources available to the parties more closely than the
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ing public interest in settling lawsuits against the government, especially
when the litigation is likely to involve complex issues, as is the case in
many environmental disputes.280
The reforms proposed by the Chamber of Commerce and the reforms in the proposed congressional legislation will not limit the authority of environmental groups or any other persons to sue the EPA or other
agencies when the agencies fail to take actions required by law or when
the agencies violate the law. Citizens will continue to sue the government
in those cases.
However, the significant procedural limitations on consent decrees
and settlement agreements in the reforms, such as those proposed by the
Chamber and by Congress, will frustrate settlement of those lawsuits.281
Instead of settling the lawsuits, the government (and therefore the public)
will spend significant amounts of money and time defending those lawsuits in court.282 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the reforms in the proposed legislation will cost almost $7 million over a fouryear period.283 To the extent that the government ultimately loses those
lawsuits in court, which is almost a certainty for most of the failure-toact lawsuits, continued litigation will lead to an increased award of attorney’s fees for the challengers and, thus, more financial liability for the
government.284 Prolonged litigation, due to the limits on settlements, will
also delay the implementation of regulations and agency actions that will
provide benefits to human health and the environment.285
In addition to the above-mentioned harms, the proposed reforms interfere with judicial powers to manage litigation dockets and to resolve
disputes equitably and efficiently, which is problematic in a litigious society.286 The reforms threaten to impose all of those costs without providing significant benefits, as there is little evidence that there is any underlying problem to remedy. Aside from the allegations in its report, which
have been shown here to be without merit, the Chamber provides no evidence that the EPA or other agencies are entering into any collusive set-

merits of the parties’ legal claims. Id. In addition, by settling a case, the parties “deprive society of
the precedential value of an adjudicated judgment.” Id.
280. See Jacobs, supra note 264, at 154.
281. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-593, at 22 (2012) (dissenting views).
282. Id. at 30.
283. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, H.R. 1493: SUNSHINE FOR REGULATORY DECREES AND
SETTLEMENTS ACT OF 2013 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attac
hments/hr1493.pdf.
284. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
285. See Percival, supra note 166, at 331, 333.
286. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-593, at 32 (dissenting views).
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tlements of lawsuits or that agencies are entering into settlements in order to circumvent proper rulemaking procedures.287
D. A More Modest Solution
Public awareness and participation are vital checks on the government and facilitates rational, deliberative decision making. For decades,
commentators have raised concerns that the public or persons who are
not involved in lawsuits against the government may be adversely affected by the settlement of those lawsuits if the non-parties do not have some
opportunity to participate in the settlement process.288 Accordingly, it
would not seem to be overly burdensome to require government agencies
to post a notice, on their websites and in the Federal Register, when a
person files a notice of intent to sue. Persons who are not parties to the
lawsuit but may be affected by the settlement of the suit could choose to
intervene if they felt that intervention was necessary to protect their interests.289
The existing rules for intervention are sufficiently generous to allow persons whose interests are not adequately represented in the ongoing litigation to intervene,290 so it is not necessary to modify those rules.
Regarding the settlement process, while there may be situations where
mediation or other alternative dispute resolution processes may be useful
to resolve the litigation, the decision regarding whether to refer parties to
mediation should be left to the courts, and it is not necessary to impose a
general requirement for mediation or alternative dispute resolution in all
cases against the federal government.
Once the parties have reached an agreement in litigation involving
the federal government, either as a consent decree or settlement agreement, it would not seem overly burdensome to require notice and some
opportunity for comment on the agreement before it is finalized if the
agreement is likely to adversely affect persons who are not parties to the
litigation. The requirement could be modeled on the provisions in the
Clean Air Act, which require notice in the Federal Register and a thirtyday comment period and do not require the development of a formal record for the rulemaking period.291
287. Id. at 26.
288. See supra Part II.
289. Industry representatives, trade associations, and non-government organizations routinely
monitor litigation and rulemaking to assess potential impacts on their business, members, or the
public. See Percival, supra note 166, at 349.
290. See supra Part IV.C.1.
291. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2012).
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Regarding judicial approval and supervision of the settlement
agreement or consent decree, few limits should be placed on existing
judicial authorities. Courts should continue to be allowed to approve
agreements even though they include conditions that the court could not
impose, as long as the agreements do not violate the law.292 The proposal
in the congressional legislation that would require courts to ensure that
scheduling agreements provide the government with enough time to
comply with the APA and other laws and regulations regarding rulemaking is not objectionable as long as courts accord agencies deference regarding their calculation of reasonable time frames. After all, the agency
has an incentive to develop a workable schedule since they would likely
be sued if they attempted to take the actions addressed in the scheduling
agreements without complying with the APA or other rulemaking statutes.
There is little evidence that the government is entering into collusive consent decrees and settlement agreements, as the Chamber of
Commerce charges, and the proposals suggested by the Chamber and
Congress seem to be designed to frustrate, rather than illuminate, settlement. However, since “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,”293
the modest changes outlined above to increase public participation and
transparency in the development and review of consent decrees and settlement agreements would seem beneficial in light of the prior concerns
raised by commentators such as Professors Rossi and Gaba.294

292. See supra Part IV.C.3.
293. Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, reprinted in
OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (1932).
294. See supra Part II.

